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GRIGGS v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY: AVIGATION
EASEMENTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN
PROCEEDINGS
In Griggs v. Allegheny County,' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
was faced with the question of whether the county was liable in eminent
domain proceedings for an easement of avigation by virtue of the extremely
low flight patterns of commercial airplanes over the plaintiff's property while
landing and taking off at the Greater Pittsburgh Airport. It is the purpose
of this note to consider how the supreme court answered this inquiry, and
the effect of their decision upon the law of eminent domain. First, however,
because of the rather prolonged history of this case, it may be interesting
to trace the proceedings from the lower courts through two prior supreme
court appeals.
Originally, plaintiff in the Griggs case had brought a bill in equity for
an injunction restraining commercial aircraft using the airport from flying
over his property below the floor of the navigable airspace or, alternatively,
damages for a "taking" of his property. Defendant county filed preliminary
objections contending, inter alia, that a court of equity lacked jurisdiction
over the cause of action. On appeal from a dismissal of its objections, 2 the
supreme court held that equity has jurisdiction to issue injunctions in this
general class of cases, but had no jurisdiction to assess damages for a taking
of the land, the statutory remedy being exclusive. Subsequently, the lower
court entered an order striking from plaintiff's complaint all claims for damages for a taking, leaving only a claim for injunctive relief and for damages
in trespass.
Upon leave of the lower court, the defendant airlines averred under new
matter that plaintiff had no right to enjoin commercial flights over his
property because the county had appropriated, under its right of eminent
domain, avigation easements over plaintiff's property. The county then filed
preliminary objections to this new matter, contending that the allegations
by the airlines raised an issue which the supreme court, on the previous
appeal, had decided was not within the jurisdiction of equity. The trial
court dismissed the objection, construing the decision in the prior appeal as
not prohibiting a court of equity from determining that there had been a
1. 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961).
2. Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955).
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taking. On a second appeal,3 the supreme court held that a court of equity
does not have jurisdiction under the pleadings in this case to determine
whether there was a "taking" or the amount of damages for such "taking."
The supreme court then stayed the equity proceedings until plaintiff's eminent domain proceedings or actions in trespass were completed or waived.
Griggs followed the statutory procedure 4 and the appeal in question
followed from the award in his favor in the viewers' proceeding. Plaintiff
appealed 5 on grounds of inadequacy of damages, while the county appealed
on the grounds that it had not taken the plaintiff's property. The supreme
court, in reversing the lower court, found it unnecessary to consider the
plaintiff's appeal; they held that the county was not liable for any taking,
since the invasion of plaintiff's air space was committed by commercial aircraft which were neither owned nor controlled by the county.
In reaching this decision, the supreme court purported to follow the
case of Causby v. United States6 in which the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the air space placed in the public domain by Congress does
not include airspace needed for landing and taking off. Under the Aeronautical Code of Pennsylvania a landowner owns as much of the space above his
land as is necessary for his use and enjoyment without interference. Assuming, but not deciding that the plaintiff had shown a substantial deprivation
of the use and enjoyment of his property, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the county was not the efficient legal cause of any deprivation of property which the plaintiff might have suffered.
In the Causby case, the plaintiff had sued the United States because
of numerous flights of army planes over the Plaintiff's house at low altitudes
while taking off and landing from an adjacent airfield. The court held that
the Civil Air Regulations, 7 which provided that all airspace above heights
designated by the Civil Air Commission to be safe flying altitudes were in
the public domain, did not place in the public domain airspace necessary for
taking off and landing. The army planes by their continuous low flights over
the plaintiff's land effected a taking of the plaintiff's airspace.
The Pennsylvania court distinguished the Causby case from Griggs in
that in the former case the planes which passed through the airspace
were owned by the United States, a body clothed with the power of eminent
domain, whereas in the Griggs case, the planes were not owned by the county
3. Gardner v. Allegheny County, 393 Pa. 120, 142 A.2d 187 (1958).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5604, 5608, 5613 (1956).
5. Supra note 1.
6. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). Congress repudiated this decision by enacting § 101 (24)
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 739, 49 U.S.C. 1301 (24) (1959). Pennsylvania's statutory law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1467 (Supp. 1960) is similar to the
rule in the Causby case. See Gay v. Taylor, 19 D. & C. 31 (Pa. 1932).
7. 14 C.F.R. § 60.17 (1957), defining Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 985
(1938), 49 U.S.C.A. 452(c)(1951).
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but by commercial airlines, which had no power of eminent domain. Since
a "taking" occurs only when a body with the power of eminent domain
substantially deprives a person of the use and enjoyment of his property,8
there was no taking in this case because the planes were not owned by the
county. However, if the supreme court's interpretation is correct, then the
power given by the legislature to the county to condemn land0 where an
easement of avigation over the property is necessary would be superfluous.
In agreeing with the county's contention that it was not liable for any
loss sustained by the plaintiff, the court noted that the airlines fly the planes,
the Civil Aeronautics Commission determines the flight pattern, and the
county is deprived of any control over the flights. This decision ignores the
fact that neither of these two "controlling" entities exercises any real discretion at all. The airspace through which a plane must pass in order to
take off and land with safety is governed by the geographical location of the
runway. This was determined by the county. The court, in dictum, said that
recovery could be had only against the individual airlines, the actual trespassers. This suggestion is highly impracticable, since the airlines have no
power of eminent domain. Any suit against them must be in trespass, with
proof of the damage caused by each airline individually shown. Besides the
impossibility of proof, this would lead to a multiplicity of suits.
In order to obtain federal aid to construct the airport, the county agreed
with the federal government that they would "acquire such easements or
other interests in land and air space as may be necessary to perform the
covenants of this paragraph" 10 (which included an approach area over the
Grigg's property). The county had determined that this airspace should be
used by planes before any work had been begun on the airport. Therefore,
they had obligated themselves to pay for any taking that might result from
this determination.
In considering the point of the liability of the county for this taking, the
viewers report'1 analogized this case to that of Penn. Township v. Perry
County.'2 In this case Dauphin and Perry counties had built a bridge across
the Juniata River as directed by court order, but had failed to provide
approach areas. The court held that these approach areas were an indispensable part of the bridge, and that an order to build a bridge necessarily
includes a provision for adequate approach areas.
The county further argues that it was not its act which caused the
deprivation of use, but the acts of the individual airlines. However, the
8. Creasy v. Stevens, 160 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Pa. -1958); Miller v. City of
Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
9. Airport Zoning Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1550 (Supp. 1960).
10. Supra note 1 at 432, 168 A.2d at 133-34.
11. Record, p. 203a-04a, supra note 1.
12. 78 Pa. 457 (1875).
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opening of the airport was the natural and probable cause of the flights.
The flights were not only the natural result, they were the necessary and
desired result, without which the airport would have no function.
A municipality's use of its land as affecting the enjoyment of adjacent
land has been considered in several lateral support cases. In Hill v. Oakmont,'3 the cost of a retaining wall made necessary upon the lowering of
the grade of the street by a municipality was held to be a proper element of
damages. Similarly, in Lynn v. Dunmore,14 the fact that a municipality was
liable to an abutter for damages to his property by reason of the grading of
the adjoining street was not disputed and the only question before the court
was the amount of damages. The fact that another human element intrudes
in the Griggs case should be irrelevant since the trespass is necessarily caused
by the County's establishment of the airport.
The county also has a duty to see that these approach areas are free
from obstructions and safe for flight. 15 Furthermore, they are given the
power to achieve this end by two means: zoning and condemnation proceedings. In this case the planes passed over the Griggs property at 43 feet,
or 13 feet above the chimney top.' 6 To zone this area for safety, no structure
could be built higher than those existing. Indeed, there seems to be a present
danger from existing structures. A case in point is Yara Engineering Corp.
v. Newark,' 7 where an ordinance regulating and restricting the height of
structures and objects of natural growth and otherwise regulating the use of
land in the vicinity of a municipal airport was held to constitute the taking of
private property without due process of law, in violation of the federal
Constitution. This has been the ruling in an increasing number of decisions.18 The duty to zone or to condemn has been placed on the county. If
under these circumstances zoning is unconstitutional, as it seems to be, then
they must condemn the land. If they do not act, they either endanger the
lives of those in the planes or deprive the plaintiffs of their property without
due process of law.
The question of the county's liability as owner and manager of the
airport rather than owner of the planes has been considered in several cases.
In Ackerman v. Port of Seattle,19 a conclusion opposite to Griggs was
reached. The city of Seattle built and operated an airport near the plantiff's
property. In taking off and landing, planes came sufficiently close to the
plaintiff's land that the court held that there had been a taking of the land.
13. 47 Pa. Super. 261 (1911).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

80 Pa. Super. 590 (1923).
Airport Zoning Act, supra note 9.
Record, p. 214a, supra note 1.
132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. N. J. 1945).
Rice v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 387, 40 A.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. N. J. 1945).
55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
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They then proceeded to consider whether the Port of Seattle could be liable
for the taking. The Port, as the county in the Griggs case, operated none
of the planes, nor were they able to control their flight paths. The court held
that the taking of an approach way is reasonably necessary to the maintenance and operation of the airstrip. "The liability of the Port," the court
said, "is predicated on the Port's alleged failure to provide adequate facilities,
necessitating the frequent low flights over appellant's land (and thus, as we
have seen, through the appellant's private airspace)."
This point was also considered in Meloy v. Santa Monica,20 where the
court held that the city was not liable for the tort of a lessee-pilot who flew
below regulation height and created a nuisance, adding that had the nuisance
been created or had the trespass occurred during normal use of the airport,
then the lessor-city would be liable.
Reynolds v. Wilson 2 1 involved a case where the defendants, who had
leased an airport from the city of New Castle, continually flew their planes
over the plaintiff's house at very low altitudes, while landing and taking off.
The court granted an injunction to restrain defendants from flying over the
plaintiff's house at altitudes lower than 100 feet. In the course of his opinion,
Braham, P. J., said:
Why should a municipality which owns an airport, or its
leasee, be permitted to appropriate a glide path over the lands of
the adjoining owner ? If the municipal airport could not be reached
by land without passing over the property of an adjoining owner
no one would contend for a right of passage without compensation.
The flight path within a few feet of plaintiff's dwelling appropriates
something just as real and probably of more value than a right of
way over the surface, through the power of eminent domain. It has
the same power to condemn a right of way through the air. Why
should it not do so ?22
In view of the fact that the county was the agency whose original determination of location of the airport and its runways, there seems to be no
compelling reason to permit the county to be excused from its constitutional,
statutory, and in this case, contractual duty, to condemn the airspace taken by
the users of its facilities in the ordinary operation of the airport. Progress
is necessary, but the change must be paid for where the constitution demands
payment.
DAVID J. HUMPHREYS
20. 124 Cal. App. 622, 12 P.2d 1073 (Dist. Ct. 3d Dist. 1932).
21. 8 Lawrence, L. J. 67, 67 D. & C. 286 (Pa. 1949).
22. Id. at 74, 67 D. & C. at 291.

